Anaphora and Definite Descriptions: Two Applications of Game-Theoretical Semantics
Springer Science & Business Media, Aug 31, 1985 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 250 pages
I n order to appreciate properly what we are doing in this book it is necessary to realize that our approach to linguistic theorizing differs from the prevailing views. Our approach can be described by indicating what distinguishes it from the methodological ideas current in theoretical linguistics, which I consider seriously misguided. Linguists typically construe their task in these days as that of making exceptionless generalizations from particular examples. This explanatory strategy is wrong in several different ways. It presupposes that we can have "intuitions" about particular examples, usually examples invented by the linguist himself or herself, reliable and sharp enough to serve as a basis of sharp generalizations. It also presupposes that we cannot have equally reliable direct access to general linguistic regularities. Both assumptions appear to me extremely dubious, and the first of them has in effect been challenged by linguists like Dwight Bol inger. There is also some evidence that the degree of unanimity among linguists is fairly low when it comes to less clear cases, even in connection with such relatively simple questions as grammaticality (acceptability). For this reason we have tried to rely more on quotations from contemporary fiction, newspapers and magazines than on linguists' and philosophers' ad hoc examples. I also find it strange that some of the same linguists as believe that we all possess innate ideas about general characteristics of humanly possible grammars assume that we can have access to them only via their particular consequences.
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Equivalence with Tarskitype truthdefinitions
Translation to higherorder languages
Partially ordered quantifiers
Subgames and functional interpretations
Extension to natural languages
Similarities and differences between formal and natural languages
Competing ordering principles
Vagaries of the alleged headanaphor relation
The anaphoric use of definite descriptions as a semantical phenomenon
The quantifierexclusion phenomenon in natural languages
Inductive choice sets
Other uses of the
The Russellian use
The generic use motivated
Conclusions from the pragmatic deduction
Further rules for natural languages
Notes to Part I
Prima facie difficulties with Russells theory
Can we localize Russells theory?
Gametheoretical solution to the localization problem
Anaphoric the in formal languages
Epithetic and counterepithetic thephrases
Other editions - View all
Anaphora and Definite Descriptions: Two Applications of Game-Theoretical ...
Jaakko Hintikka,J. Kulas
No preview available - 1985
anaphoric Me-phrases anaphoric pronouns antecedent approach atomic sentences Bill c-command choice set clause comm context contrast coreferential counterexamples definite descriptions Dick discussed donkey earlier subgames entities Exclusion Principle explained expressions facie fact first-order first-order logic following examples formal languages formulated function game has reached game rule game-theoretical semantics genitive head Hence idea illustrated individuals input sentence instance interpretation Jaakko Hintikka John Kenneth Widmerpool kind Langacker-Ross condition lexical linguists logical Myself's natural languages nevertheless node nonreflexive pronouns notion of coreference noun occurs ordering principles output sentence phenomena phenomenon players possible pragmatic prepositional problem pronominal pronouns of laziness proper names quantification theory quantifier phrases reached a sentence reference reflexive pronoun Reinhart relation relevant restricted rule application rule G rule is applied Russell's theory Russellian scope second subgame semantical game sense sentence in question speaker strategic meaning syntactical structure the-phrase theoretical treatment uniqueness winning strategy yields