Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction
Do animals have moral rights? If so, what does this mean? What sorts of mental lives do animals have, and how should we understand welfare? By presenting models for understanding animals' moral status and rights, and examining their mental lives and welfare, David DeGrazia explores the implications for how we should treat animals in connection with our diet, zoos, and research. Animal Rights distinguishes itself by combining intellectual rigour with accessibility, offering a distinct moral voice with a non-polemical tone. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
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A. C. Grayling alternatives animal research animal rights animal subjects Animal Welfare animals have moral anxiety argue argument awareness basic-needs behaviour benefits biological biomedical cages captive animals captivity cause Chapter claim comparable interests comparable-life condition confinement consider consideration for animals creatures cruelty to animals death harms deserve equal consideration desire-based Draize test emotional entails ethical evidence example experience experiential well-being factory farming family farms fear feelings harm animals harm of death harm to animals hominids Humane Slaughter Act humans and animals inegalitarian invertebrates issues judgement justify keeping animals killing lack moral status least Malise Ruthven mental lives monkeys moral agency moral rights morally important mouse nociception obligations Peter Singer pets philosophers pigeons presumption reason requires sentient animals significantly interfere sliding-scale model social species preservation strong animal-rights view suffering Taking Animals tests Tom Regan typically unequal consideration unnecessary harm unpleasant utilitarianism utility-trumping sense vertebrates wrong zoo animals
Page 124 - ... dances (Through Our Eyes Only?, pp. 88-99). 44 This example is developed in Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 56-57. Carruthers cites H. Rachlin, Behaviour and Learning (Oxford: Freeman, 1976), pp. 125-26, 45 Andrew N. Rowan, Franklin M. Loew, and Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts Center for Animals and Public Policy, 1994), p. 74. 46 Bateson, "Assessment of Pain in Animals,