Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic WarningCenter for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002 - Deception - 175 pages |
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accept activity adversary adversary's alert assessments attack basic believe buildup capabilities Chinese collection combat Communist conceal conclusions course of action crises Cuba Cuban missile crisis current intelligence decisions Defense Intelligence Agency deployments developments effort enemy enemy's estimates evidence fact factor gence impending important indications analyst indicator list intelligence analyst Intelligence Community intelligence system intentions invasion of Czechoslovakia involved issue Korea leadership least likelihood logistic preparations major Manchuria ments military action military deception military forces military indications military preparations missiles mobilization North Vietnamese objective obvious occur offensive operations order-of-battle analysts particularly Pearl Harbor perception plans policy official policymaker political indications possible potential probably propaganda recognize relevant reports Sherman Kent South Korea South Vietnam Soviet Union specific strategic warning surprise tend tion U.S. intelligence units USSR usually valid Vietnam warning analyst warning intelligence warning judgment warning problem warning process Warsaw Pact World War II
Popular passages
Page 78 - For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness.
Page 142 - USIB's unanimous approval of the September estimate reflects similar sensitivities. On September 13 the President had asserted that there were no Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba and committed his Administration to act if offensive missiles were discovered. Before Congressional committees, Administration officials were denying that there was any evidence whatever of offensive missiles in Cuba. The implications of a National Intelligence estimate which concluded that the Soviets were introducing...
Page 142 - What the President least wanted to hear, the CIA was most hesitant to say plainly. On August 22 John McCone met privately with the President and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.97 Kennedy heard this as what it was: the suspicion of a hawk.
Page 141 - House had set down a policy for relaxation of tension with the East. This policy background was much more subtle in its influence than documents or diplomatic experience. For when an official policy or hypothesis is laid down, it tends to obscure alternative hypotheses, and to lead to overemphasis of the data that support it, particularly in a situation of increasing tension, when it is important not to "rock the boat.
Page 42 - the act or process Reasoning of reasoning from a part to a whole, from particulars to generals, or from the individual to the universal.
Page 43 - Villon's shift from the general to the particular, or from the universal to the...
Page 121 - the deceiver is almost always successful regardless of the sophistication of his victim in the same art."56 Stalin was alert to what he believed was British disinformation in 1940-41, but less sensitive to German deception.
Page 49 - Robert D. Folker, Jr., Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods, Occasional Paper, no. 7 (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2000), 1. 7. William MK Trochim, "The Qualitative Debate," Cornell University: Research Methods Knowledge Base 2002, trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/qualdeb.htm (31 May 2002).
Page 139 - Probability," in Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994).
Page 9 - ... indications and their analysis in depth. It is imperative to the process that the facts, including potential or possible facts, and other indications be most diligently and meticulously compiled and analyzed. It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of exhaustive research for warning. It is in the history of every great warning crisis that the post-mortems have turned up numerous relevant facts 9Col John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Collection of un-numbered briefing slides,...