Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate
World Bank, Jan 1, 2000 - Business & Economics - 101 pages
The old Russian saying of 'kto kovo' (Who will get whom?) has become 'kem skhvachena eto?' (Who has captured this?) under the new transition economy. Instead of one major figure, such as a Stalin or Lenin, vanquishing lesser personages to advance their political aims, many people are taking over corporations to increase their market domination. Their methods are no less brutal, ruthless, or corrupt. In turn, corporations are 'capturing' the state to influence legislation and regulation to their advantage. The advantages for the corporations create disadvantages for the general public and the poor in particular. In many countries, the public perceives corruption to be woven into the basic institutional framework, undermining governance, and weakening the credibility of the state. Recognizing that corruption is one of the most serious obstacles to development, the World Bank has made combating it a central institutional priority. This report analyzes corruption across transition countries and its potential repercussions on their country strategy. The report places primary emphasis on the distinction between state capture and administrative corruption while presenting strategies to avoid both forms of corruption. These strategies recognize and address distinctions in the levels and patterns of corruption in transition countries.
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The Level and Pattern of Corruption in the Transition Countries
Worldwide Perceptions of Corruption
The Economic and Social Consequences of Corruption in Transition Countries
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actors administrative corruption Albania anticorruption program Armenia assets Azerbaijan BEEPS data BEEPS survey Belarus bribes bureaucrats capacity capture and administrative Central challenges civil society combating corruption conflict of interest corruption in transition credibility Croatia Czech Republic EBRD economic interests economic reforms effective anticorruption strategy enterprises environment Figure foreign direct investment forms of corruption framework groups Hellman impact implementation incentives influence judiciary Kazakhstan Latvia laws leadership level of corruption levels of administrative margin of error measures Medium Moldova oversight pattern of corruption percent Poland political accountability political and economic political competition political parties politicians private interests private sector problem public administration public officials region regulations regulatory regulatory capture revenues role Romania Russia share of firms Slovak Republic Slovenia social strengthening structures transition countries transparency Transparency International Turkmenistan Ukraine unbundling Uzbekistan weak World Bank