Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate
World Bank Publications, Jan 1, 2000 - Political Science - 101 pages
The old Russian saying of 'kto kovo' (Who will get whom?) has become 'kem skhvachena eto?' (Who has captured this?) under the new transition economy. Instead of one major figure, such as a Stalin or Lenin, vanquishing lesser personages to advance their political aims, many people are taking over corporations to increase their market domination. Their methods are no less brutal, ruthless, or corrupt. In turn, corporations are 'capturing' the state to influence legislation and regulation to their advantage. The advantages for the corporations create disadvantages for the general public and the poor in particular. In many countries, the public perceives corruption to be woven into the basic institutional framework, undermining governance, and weakening the credibility of the state. Recognizing that corruption is one of the most serious obstacles to development, the World Bank has made combating it a central institutional priority. This report analyzes corruption across transition countries and its potential repercussions on their country strategy. The report places primary emphasis on the distinction between state capture and administrative corruption while presenting strategies to avoid both forms of corruption. These strategies recognize and address distinctions in the levels and patterns of corruption in transition countries.
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1.4 are included administrative corruption Albania anticorruption program assets audit Azerbaijan BEEPS survey Belarus bribes capacity capture and administrative Central challenge Chapter civil society combating corruption concentrated conflict of interest Corruption in Transition credibility Croatia Czech Republic EBRD economic interests economic reforms effective anticorruption strategy enterprises Estonia firms foreign direct investment forms of corruption framework groups Hellman impact implementation incentives influence judiciary Kaufmann Kazakhstan Latvia legacies level of corruption levels of administrative Lithuania measures Medium Moldova oversight party financing pattern of corruption payments percent Poland political accountability political competition political parties politicians private interests private sector problem public administration public officials public sector reduce region regulations regulatory revenues role Romania Russia simple statistical significance Slovak Republic Slovenia social strengthen structures transition countries transparency Transparency International Turkmenistan typology of corruption Ukraine World Bank
Page 52 - June 1991 on prevention of the use of the = | financial system for the purpose of money laundering B Content The Directive essentially provides for an extension of the scope of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive of 1991.
Page 2 - ... intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and nontransparent provision of private gains to public officials'.
Page 5 - Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic...
Page 4 - These surveys were conducted jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; they are known as the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). 11. This forthcoming analysis is tentatively titled "Anticorruption in Transition 3.
Page xi - GWh gigawatt-hour HDI Human Development Index IEA International Energy Agency IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle IMF International Monetary Fund IPP independent power producer kb/d thousand barrels...
Page 52 - February 1999, makes it a crime to offer, promise or give a bribe to a foreign public official in order to obtain or retain international business deals. A related text effectively puts an end to the practice according to tax deductibility for bribe payments made to foreign officials.
Page 1 - Russian energy sector, involves "the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public or private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials".
Page xi - ... Nations Environment Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMIK United Nations (Interim) Administration Mission in Kosovo UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars USIP United States Institute for Peace VJ Yugoslav Armed Forces WFP World Food Programme WHO...
Page 21 - World Bank report states that "inequality within the transition countries has increased at an alarming pace. In some countries of the region inequality has now reached levels on par with the most unequal Latin American countries" (World Bank 2000). The popular anti-corruption discourse is not a discourse on transparency or good government, it is a discourse on the rise of inequality. This is the reason why anti-corruption discourse is the most popular discourse for criticizing...