Antitrust Economics; Price Theory and Industrial Organization; Cartels, Tacit Collusion, Joint Ventures and Other Combinations of Competitors; Monopolization, Attempt to Monopolize and Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Non-Price Restraints; Refusals to Deal; Horizontal Mergers; Conglomerate Mergers; Price Discrimination and Differential Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman Act; Jurisdictional, Public Policy and Regulatory Limitations on the Domain of Antitrust; Enforcement, Procedure and Related Matters.
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Cartels Tacit Collusion Joint Ventures and Other Combinations of Competitors
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action agreement anticompetitive antitrust policy antitrust violation apply Areeda-Turner test Argylcru argyle crew sox attempt to monopolize barriers to entry buyer cartel members charge Clayton Act competitive market competitors concerted refusals conduct conglomerate mergers Corp customers dealers decision defendant demand curve doctrine economies of scale efficient elasticity of demand elasticity of supply entry barriers example exclusive dealing exemption facilitate firm's free rider horizontal mergers Hovenkamp illegal injury joint venture Justice Department manufacturer marginal cost market power market share Merger Guidelines monopolist monopoly price monopoly profits oligopoly output perfect competition plaintiff post-merger firm predatory pricing price discrimination price fixing profit-maximizing price refusal to deal regulated relevant market requirement resale price maintenance reservation price result retail Robinson-Patman Act rule of reason S.Ct sell seller Sherman Act supplier Supreme Court held tacit collusion territorial TIE-INS Today tying arrangements tying product vertical integration vertical mergers vertical nonprice restraints vertical restrictions