Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

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Cambridge University Press, Mar 27, 2003 - Law - 413 pages
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This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton has presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution.
 

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Contents

Economics
1
II Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly
9
III Further Topics
21
Law and Policy
27
I Some Interpretation Issues
28
II Enacting the Antitrust Laws
30
III What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do?
40
Enforcement
43
III Predatory Pricing
212
IV Conclusion
228
Power
230
II Determinants of Market Power
235
Cellophane
237
Alcoa
239
Guidelines
243
Attempts
244

II Enforcement Provisions of the Antitrust Laws
47
Appendix
64
Cartels
68
II Conscious Parallelism
73
III Conclusion
89
Development of Section 1 Doctrine
90
II Rule of Reason and PerSe Rule
104
III Conclusion
112
Rule of Reason and PerSe Rule
113
Further Developments
116
Understanding the Supreme Courts Justification for the PerSe Rule
129
Agreement
132
I The Development of Inference Doctrine
133
II Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory
140
Facilitating Mechanisms
144
I Data Dissemination Cases
145
II Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices
154
Economics
160
Boycotts
166
II PostSocony
170
III PostBMISylvania
181
IV Conclusion
184
Monopolization
186
II Leveraging and Essential Facilities
202
II Dangerous Probability Requirement
248
Vertical Restraints
252
II Vertical Nonprice Restraints
262
III Manufacturer Retains Title
267
IV Agreement
270
Tying and Exclusive Dealing
279
II Early Cases
284
III Development of PerSe Rule
286
IV Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and PerSe Rule
295
V Technological Typing
301
VI Exclusive Dealing
303
Appendix
307
Horizontal Mergers
311
II Horizontal Merger Law
317
III Conclusion
330
Mergers Vertical and Conglomerate
333
II Conglomerate Mergers
344
III Concluding Remarks
351
Antitrust and the State
352
I NoerrPennington Doctrine
354
II Parker Doctrine
371
Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines
375
Index
379
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About the author (2003)

Keith N. Hylton has taught at the School of Law of Boston University since 1995. He previously served on the faculty and was tenured at Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Hylton currently teaches courses in antitrust, torts, and labor law, and writes widely in the field of law and economics, with more than forty publications in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. He has served as a Director of the American Law and Economics Association.

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