Antitrust, innovation, and competitiveness
Americans are confronted with a paradox: the United States has become increasingly long on competition and short on competitiveness. The growing debate on the competitiveness of the United States has been spurred by a less than salutary economic growth. Even with recent profound changes in United States antitrust laws, such as progress towards taking into account global competition, little scholarship has been compiled on the connection of antitrust laws to trade or technology policy. Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness explores how the U.S. antitrust laws, especially the Sherman Antitrust Act, have affected the ways in which U.S. corporations can compete in world markets. The editors begin with the consideration that current antitrust laws unwisely restrain innovation and competitiveness by inhibiting desirable pro-competitive communication, cooperation, and alliances among firms. This results in an impediment to the performance of U.S. firms competing in industries experiencing rapid technological change. Not all of the contributors agreed with the editors about the degree to which the antitrust laws do indeed inhibit innovation or U.S. industrial performance. Thus, the book represents a variety of views on a topic of increasing importance. Contributors include Professors Phillip Areeda, William J. Baumol, Ann I. Jones, Robert P. Merges, Richard R. Nelson, Janusz A. Ordover, Thomas M. Jorde, Richard Schmalensee, Lawrence A. Sullivan, David J. Teece, Oliver E. Williamson, and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook.
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Innovation Cooperation and Antitrust
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activities agreement analysis anticompetitive antitrust law antitrust policy applied price theory approach Areeda argued arguments benefits Bork broad patent cartels challenged chemical Chicago claims commercialization competitors conduct consumers contestability contract cooperative innovation arrangement Corp decisions defendants disclosure discussed doctrine of equivalents DOJ or FTC Easterbrook economists effects enforcement exploitive firms Genentech Griffith horizontal restraints improvement industrial policy infringement innovation process interfirm invention inventor involved issues joint ventures Jorde and Teece Journal judges jury Law Review leverage licensing litigation market power market share ment monopolist monopoly NCAA Ordover organization output patent scope perfect competition plaintiff potential practice price discrimination prior art problem procompetitive product patents profits relevant market rent seeking require restrictive rivals rule of reason Sherman Act standard static structure subsection supra note Supreme Court technical advance tion Topco Trade transaction cost economics United vertical integration welfare Williamson