Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human CognitionMark Siderits, Tom J. F. Tillemans, Arindam Chakrabarti When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone to use the word "pot" or to see something as a pot. The Buddhist apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the element uniting all pots is their very difference from all non-pots. In other words, when we seek out a pot, we select an object that is not a non-pot, and we repeat this practice with all other items and expressions. Writing from the vantage points of history, philosophy, and cognitive science, the contributors to this volume clarify the nominalist apoha theory and explore the relationship between apoha and the scientific study of human cognition. They engage throughout in a lively debate over the theory's legitimacy. Classical Indian philosophers challenged the apoha theory's legitimacy, believing instead in the existence of enduring essences. Seeking to settle this controversy, essays explore whether apoha offers new and workable solutions to problems in the scientific study of human cognition. They show that the work of generations of Indian philosophers can add much toward the resolution of persistent conundrums in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. |
Contents
Dignāga | 50 |
Its Presuppositions and Main | 64 |
Key Features of Dharmakīrtis Apoha Theory | 84 |
Dharmakīrtis Discussion of Circularity | 109 |
Apoha Theory as an Approach to Understanding | 125 |
Constructing the Content of Awareness Events | 149 |
A Critical Account | 170 |
Apoha FeaturePlacing and Sensory Content | 228 |
Funes and Categorization in an AbstractionFree World | 247 |
Some Simpleminded Questions and Doubts | 258 |
Classical Semantics and Apoha Semantics | 273 |
Śrughna by Dusk | 283 |
Bibliography | 305 |
ListofContributors | 321 |
Other editions - View all
Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition Mark Siderits,Tom Tillemans,Arindam Chakrabarti Limited preview - 2011 |
Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition Mark Siderits,Tom Tillemans,Tom J. F. Tillemans,Arindam Chakrabarti No preview available - 2011 |
Common terms and phrases
absence answer anyāpoha apoha theory Apohavāda appears apply argument awareness basis bottom-up Buddhist causal characterized circularity claim color conceptual cognition constructed denotation Dharmakīrti Dharmottara Dignāga discussion distinct Dunne entities epistemology example exclusion theorists experience explain expression fact feature-placing fire function Gnoli hence idea imprints Indian individual inference inferential jāti Jñānaśrīmitra judgment kind terms Kumārila Kumārila Bhaṭṭa language linguistic item logic meaning mental image Mīmāṃsā model theory monadic predicate logic nature negation negative nominalism nominalist non-P nonconceptual noncow Nyāya ontology Patil perceived perception phenomenal form philosophical positive predicate problem PVSV ad PV question Ratnakīrti real universals realist reference relation representations resemblance śabda Sakya Pandita sāmānya Sanskrit semantic sense sensory Siderits signified object similar substance theory of concepts things thought Tibetan Tillemans tion tree Uddyotakara understanding unique particulars Vaiśeṣika vikalpa word cow word existent yavac Yogācāra