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Chapter One The Columbia Accident
Chapter Three Culture and Communication in NASA
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Admiral Gehman agency Air Force analysis Apollo Program asked Braun briefing CAIB Report called cause Challenger accident Chapter Columbia accident contractors Control Center damage debris strike decision developed disaster Dittemore Enron external tank fault tree foam debris hindsight bias in-house individual International Space Station interview lab director launch learned left wing Linda Ham Marshall Center McCurdy McCurdy's McWane Mission Management Team Monday Notes MSFC NASA NASA employees NASA's O-rings Orbiter organization organizational communication organizational identification personnel problems rationalization recommendations responsibility risk Rocha Rogers Commission Ron Dittemore safety Saturn schedule Schwartz Sean O'Keefe sensors seven astronauts shuttle accident shuttle managers shuttle program manager Space Center space program space shuttle Space Shuttle Program Space Station spacecraft systems engineering Thiokol tiles tion Tompkins ture ultimate value United Space Alliance Vaughan Wal-Mart Wald wanted Wiesman workers wrote