Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 13–16, 1978Steven J. Brams, A. Schotter, Gerhard Schwödiauer |
Contents
Power and Negotiation | 34 |
Voting Weights as Power Proxies Some Theoretical and Empiri | 85 |
A Model of the U S Presidential Primary Campaign | 118 |
Copyright | |
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Abraham allocation alternative analysis assume assumption Banzhaf index bargaining set behavior Brams C₁ C₂ candidates characteristic function choice choose coalition structure competitive solution conflict cooperative game core costs decision defined denote distribution district economic electoral entry equation equilibrium point example exists fake attack firm game theory game type given grand coalition institutions Jephthah Lorenz curves Mathematical maximize measure mixed strategy monetary monopolist n-person game Nash equilibrium negotiation OPEC outcome output P₁ paradox Pareto optimal parties payoff vector percent players Political possible predicted preferences primaries probability Proposition pure strategies quarreling quartet real attack rule sequence Shapley value simple game situation solution concepts subset tariff Theorem tion transferable utility variable voter voting body voting power voting weights weighted voting winning coalitions y₁ Zipke index