Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games
This book explores the role of artificial intelligence in the development of a claim that morality is person-made and rational. Professor Danielson builds moral robots that do better than amoral competitors in a tournament of games like the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken. The book thus engages in current controversies over the adequacy of the received theory of rational choice. It sides with Gauthier and McClennan, who extend the devices of rational choice to include moral constraint. Artificial Morality goes further, by promoting communication, testing and copying of principles and by stressing empirical tests.
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FUNDAMENTAL JUSTIFICATION AND GAMES
NATURE AND ARTIFICE
INFORMATION AND ITS COSTS
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acquiesce act utilitarian adaptive players Amoralist argue argument Artificial Morality assumption behaviour better broad co-operator CC and RC Chapter choose co-operative co-ordination problem compliance problem conclusion conditional constrained maximization contractarian Copycoopl costs David Gauthier decision procedure defect defend discrimination dispositions ESM1 example exploit Extended Prisoner's Dilemma fundamental justification game of Chicken game theory Gauthier 1986a impartiality implement indirect maximizer interaction invade iterated Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma justification of morality kin selection less moral agents moral constraint moral players moral theory move move2 movel narrow co-operation operation outcomes payoff population predicate preferences Prolog promise pure conflict question rational agents rational choice rational morality received theory reciprocal altruism reciprocal co-operation responsive players sequential game situation sociobiology straightforward maximizers strategy substantive rationality theory of rational threatening threats Tit for Tat tournament transparent UCP1 unconditional co-operators utilitarian