Attitudes and Changing Contexts

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Springer Science & Business Media, Mar 30, 2006 - Philosophy - 273 pages
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In this book, the author defends a unified externalists account of propositional attitudes and reference, and formalizes this view within possible world semantics. He establishes a link between philosophical analyses of intentionality and reference and formal semantic theories of discourse representation and context change. Stalnakerian diagonalization plays an important role here. Anaphora are treated as referential expressions, while presupposition is seen as a propositional attitude. The relation between belief change and the semantic analyses of conditional sentences and evidential (knowledge) and buletic (desire) propositional attitudes is discussed extensively.

 

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Contents

Content belief and belief attributions
7
Referential and Descriptive Pronouns
71
Intentional Identity 127
126
Presupposition Satisfaction
147
Conditionals and belief change
163
Some other attitudes 207
206
A Twodimensional counterpart theory
235
B Context Change Theory
243
The Triviality result
253
Index 269
268
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