Attitudes and Changing Contexts

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Springer Science & Business Media, Jan 18, 2006 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 273 pages
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In this book, the author defends a unified externalists account of propositional attitudes and reference, and formalizes this view within possible world semantics. He establishes a link between philosophical analyses of intentionality and reference and formal semantic theories of discourse representation and context change. Stalnakerian diagonalization plays an important role here. Anaphora are treated as referential expressions, while presupposition is seen as a propositional attitude. The relation between belief change and the semantic analyses of conditional sentences and evidential (knowledge) and buletic (desire) propositional attitudes is discussed extensively.


"Van Rooij has new and interesting things to say both about foundational issues in the philosophy of language, and about the details of specific analyses, f.e. about intensional identity, epistemic modals, propositional attitude attributions, presupposition accommodation, conditionals and belief change." Robert Stalnaker, MIT

 

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Contents

Content belief and belief attributions
7
12 Possible world semantics
9
13 The description theory of reference
11
14 The description theory of reference and externalism
14
15 The pragmatic account of intentionality
20
the causalinformational account
22
17 Combining the pragmatic and causal accounts
25
twodimensional semantics
28
451 Denials
158
452 Modal subordination
159
46 Conclusion
161
Conditionals and belief change
163
52 The LewisStalnaker analysis of conditionals
164
53 The Ramsey test analysis
169
54 The Bayesian approach
172
55 Triviality
176

19 Solving problems by diagonalisation
33
110 Selflocating beliefs
37
1102 Fine grained possibilities
38
1103 Stalnakers solution
41
111 Belief and de dicto belief attributions
45
1112 Diagonalisation and partly linguistic beliefs
49
1113 Diagonalisation and proper names
52
112 De re belief attributions
57
1122 Externalism and Counterpart theory
63
1123 Counterpart theory
64
Referential and Descriptive Pronouns
71
22 Some classical approaches to anaphora
73
23 A referential analysis of anaphoric pronouns
76
24 Comparison with standard dynamic semantics
85
25 Discourse referents and diagonalisation
87
252 Bridging the gap by diagonalisation
88
253 The status of possibilities and discourse referents
91
26 Referential descriptions and propositional concepts
98
27 Epistemic might
103
28 Descriptive pronouns
106
29 Plurals quantifiers and functional pronouns
116
210 Donkeys and the specificity of indefinites
122
Intentional Identity
127
32 The problem of intentional identity
128
33 Asymmetry explained by descriptive approaches
131
331 Crossspeaker anaphora
132
332 Intentional identity
134
34 Problems for descriptive approaches
137
342 Intentional identity
138
35 Speakers reference
140
36 Speaker as responsible for asymmetry
143
37 Belief objects and externalism
145
Presupposition Satisfaction
147
42 Standard Implementation
149
432 Formalization
152
44 Quantification and anaphora
155
442 Anaphora
156
45 No canceIlation or local accommodation
157
56 Reactions to triviality
177
561 Imaging versus epistemic revision
178
562 Van Fraassen
179
563 Two kinds of belief change
180
564 Adams
181
565 Lewis
182
566 The preservativity principle
183
567 Gibbard
185
568 A unified account
186
57 Harpers principle and iterated revision
187
58 Gibbards problem revisited
190
59 Subjunctive conditionals again
193
510 Invalidity as illegitimate change of context
196
511 The systematicity of context change
198
512 A variable strict conditional account
199
513 Change of selection function
203
514 Conclusion
205
Some other attitudes
207
62 Evidential attitudes and plausibility
208
622 Evidential verbs
209
623 Knowledge
211
624 Be surprised
216
63 Doubt
218
64 Desire
220
641 A Hintikkastyle analysis
221
642 Desire as ceteris paribus preference
223
643 Desire as quantitative preference
224
644 A conditional analysis of desires
226
645 Buletic ordering
227
646 Combining belief revision and desirability
228
647 Intention and action
231
Twodimensional counterpart theory
235
Context Change Theory
243
Pronouns as referential expressions
247
The Triviality result
253
Bibliography
257
Index
269
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Page ii - Editor: JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University, USA Editors: DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands...

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