Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, Issue 5745
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996 - Emissions trading - 33 pages
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices.
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1995 vintage allowances Acid Rain Program advance auction Advani Aiition Vintage allocated allowance prices allowance tracking system allowance trading allowances sold auction design auction prices behavior bid price bidders buyers and sellers CAAA Cason and Plott Cleaiing Clean Air Act Compliance Strategy Review David Card Direct Sales Reserve discriminatory auction electric utilities Emission Trading Environmental Economics Environmental Protection Agency EPA auctions EPA's allowance tracking EPA's annual auction EPA's mandatory EX price gopher at nber.harvard.edu Hausker House staff http://nber.harvard.edu iiii Hih list of NBER market clearing price MARKET FOR SULFUR market price Massachusetts Avenue NBER Working Papers number of allowances Offegd offer curve offered for sale offers to sell opportunity cost bounds parties private trading activity private transactions purchase Qiantity EiA Schmalensee 1996 SO2 allowance SO2 emissions spot auction sulfur dioxide Tennessee Valley Authority Title trading mechanisms U.S. Environmental Protection vintage 1995 allowance vintage 2000 allowances World Wide Web