Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy
This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not.
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Better Judgment Nature and Function
Exercising SelfControl A Motivational Problem
SelfControl Akrasia and SecondOrder Desires
SelfControl and Belief
SelfControl Akrasia and Emotion
The Upper Reaches of SelfControl and the Ideally SelfControlled Person
Transition From SelfControl to Autonomy
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