Bankruptcy & Distressed Restructurings: Analytical Issues and Investment Opportunities
Edward I. Altman
Beard Books, Dec 1, 1998 - Law - 417 pages
In today's vulnerable and volatile business climate, corporate bankruptcy and Chapter 11 reorganization is a common occurrence at U.S. corporations of all sizes, in all sectors. As a result, the market for distressed firms' debt and equity securities has captured the interest and imagination of the investment community like never before. Bringing together some of the most prominent people in both the practitioner and academic communities, Bankruptcy & Distressed Restructurings includes the determinants of successful distressed exchange issues and Chapter 11 proceedings, bankruptcy and liquidation costs and their impact on corporate values, investment opportunities in distressed and defaulted securities, management and competitor behavior related to distress, and an evaluation of investor priorities and market efficiencies. With contributions from more than 30 experts, this insightful look at corporate distress is must reading for anyone involved with corporate finance, financial markets, economics, and law.
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FIRM VALUATION AND CORPORATE LEVERAGED RESTRUCTURINGS
TROUBLED DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PRIVATE REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS IN DEFAULT
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC CREDITOR EXPERIENCE IN DISTRESSED FIRM DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS
MANAGING A DISTRESSED FIRM
BANKRUPTCY COSTS AND VIOLATION OF CLAIMS PRIORITY
A MARKET ASSESSMENT OF BANKRUPTCY COSTS AND LIQUIDATION COSTS
INDUSTRY CONTAGION EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY AND FIRM SIZE
REGULATORY ISSUES IN SECONDARY TRADING OF DISTRESSED BANK LOANS
FINANCIAL DISTRESS REORGANIZATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY
BANKRUPTCY BOARDS BANKS AND BLOCKHOLDERS Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default
MANAGEMENT TURNOVER AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS
EQUITY VALUATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF US FIRMS IN REORGANIZATION
ARE STOCKHOLDERS BETTER OFF WHEN DEBT IS RESTRUCTURED PRIVATELY?
EMERGING TRENDS IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION Edward I Altman
HLT BANK LOANS A NEW MARKET FOR RELATIVE VALUE INVESTORS
abnormal returns absolute priority Altman average bankruptcy costs bankruptcy filing bankruptcy petition filed blamed its bankruptcy blockholders bondholders bonds book value buyout capital structure cash flow Chapter 11 claimants claimholders common stock corporate costs of bankruptcy court CPEs days in bankruptcy debt restructuring Debt/total assets prior default Direct costs Direct costs/total assets directors Equity holders exchange offers filed for bankruptcy Financial Economics financially distressed firms firm blamed firm value firm's firms filing Gilson holdout problem incentives increase industry Inside directors interest investment investors Journal of Financial junk bonds lenders leveraged buyout liquidation management changes market value million NYSE ownership p-value Panel payments percent percentage period prior to bankruptcy priority of claims private renegotiation publicly traded debt reorganization plan restructure their debt ruptcy shareholders significant stock returns stockholders Table Total assets prior transaction turnover unsecured creditors Wall Street Journal Warner workout
Page 13 - January 29. 1989 management, often is intimately involved in the strategic direction of the company, and on occasion even manages. That description fits Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs and Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts (KKR) well. Before the mid- 1930s, investment banks and commercial banks played a much more important role on boards of directors, monitoring management, and occasionally engineering changes in management. At the peak of their activities, JP Morgan and several of his partners served on the board...
Page 13 - I mean an investor who actually monitors management, sits on boards, is sometimes involved in dismissing management, is often intimately involved in the strategic direction of the company, and on occasion even manages.
Page 17 - ... appears to be large relative to that of the LBOs. The effective ownership interest in the gains realized by the buyout pool generally runs about 20% for the general partners as a group. LBO business unit heads also have far less bureaucracy to deal with, and far more decision rights in the running of their businesses. In effect, the LBO association substitutes incentives provided by compensation and ownership plans for the direct monitoring and often centralized decision making in the typical...