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Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Or an R Young
Theory of the Reluctant Duelist Daniel EUsberg
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accept actual agreement alternatives analysis of bargaining Anatol Rapoport assume assumption axiom bargainer's calculus bargaining problem bargaining process bargaining situation bargaining theory behavior bilateral monopoly blackmailer calculations choice choose commitment conception of bargaining concession rate conflict contract curve Cooperative Games costs Cross decision demand discussion duopolists duopoly economic models Economics of Bargaining employers equations equilibrium point example expectations factors Figure gain game theory game-theoretic given Harsanyi increase indifference curves involving linear manipulative bargaining marginal utility maximize minimax models of bargaining N-person Nash solution Nash's theory negotiations opponent opponent's other's outcome Pareto optimal parties payoff matrix perfect information player position possible postulates predictions probability profit Raiffa Rapoport rational individual relevant reprinted result rules Schelling side payments solution point specific strategic interaction strategy symmetric tactics theory of bargaining Theory of Games threat point tion two-person union utility frontier utility functions wage rate yield Zeuthen's