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The Procedures of the Experiments
The Paretian Optima
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11 bargaining pairs 9.60 Seller Buyer amount of information average cost function average revenue function bargainer's Bargaining Pattern bargaining situation behavior Bid number bilateral monopoly situation Bowley buyers and sellers Chapter complete information concessions Contracts Negotiated Contracts Reached derived determinate differential payoff economic economists equal bargaining strength expectancy experiment experimental session Fellner hypothesis fifty-fifty split Figure group decision incomplete incomplete-incomplete information increase information condition informed bargainer iso-profit tables joint profits level of aspiration marginal cost marginal intersection hypothesis marginal revenue mation maximum joint payoff ment mental Session mid-point negotiated contracts null hypothesis offer oligopoly Opening bid opponent Pair in Experimental pairs bargained parameters Paretian optima Paretian optimal quantity participants possible contract prediction presented price and quantity price leadership price-quantity prices arrived profit request quantity which maximizes rival Schelling hypothesis SIDNEY SIEGEL Siegel solution specific subjects bargained tend theoretical tion utility variables yield Zeuthen