Barriers to Conflict Resolution
W. W. Norton & Company, 1995 - Conflict management - 358 pages
Why can't we all just get along? In family life, schools, law, the business world, and domestic and international affairs, it is all too common for disputes to fester unresolved even when the parties are committed to a negotiated settlement. In this book members and associates of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation address the complex issues that protract disputes and turn potential win-win negotiations into conflicts that leave everyone worse off. Drawing on such diverse but related disciplines as economics, cognitive psychology, statistics, and game and decision-making theory, the book considers the barriers to successful negotiation in such areas as civil litigation, family law, arms control, labor-management disputes, environmental treaty making, and politics. When does it pay for parties to a dispute to cooperate, and when to compete? How can third-party negotiators further resolutions and avoid the pitfalls that deepen the divisions between antagonists? Offering answers to these and related questions, this book is a comprehensive guide to the latest understanding of ways to resolve human conflict.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Social and Psychological Perspectives
A Cognitive Perspective
The Benefit of Optional Play in Anonymous OneShot
The Role of Fairness Considerations and Relationships in
Strategic and Analytical Perspectives
On the Interpretation of Two Theoretical Models
Cooperation in the Unbalanced Commons
Other editions - View all
accept action agents agreement Amos Tversky analysis arbitration argue arms control assess BARRIERS TO CONFLICT Bazerman behavior benefits binary blocking coalitions chapter choice clients climate change concerns concessions CONFLICT RESOLUTION context convention costs countries CSCE decision defection defectors developed discussion dispute resolution economic effect emissions environmental evaluated example expected experiment fairness gains global warming greenhouse greenhouse gas incentives increase individual interactions interests involved issues Kahneman labor law firms lawyers litigation loss aversion ment Montreal protocol mutual Nash bargaining solution nations noncooperative norm offer optimal outcomes participants parties payoff percent play player political possible potential predictions preferences principle prisoner's dilemma problem procedure proposal protocol reactive devaluation reduce relationship reputation for cooperation result risk role self-interest settlement side social Soviet Union specific strategy subjects suggests threat tion tit for tat tive treaty trial trinary Tversky ultimatum game winner's curse