Psychology Press, Dec 6, 2001 - Business & Economics - 104 pages
The authors present a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and then consider its application in areas including classical pure exchange economies, public goods provision, auctions and bargaining.
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Abreu and Matsushima agents report alternative announcing assume assumption Bayesian equilibrium Bayesian implementation Bayesian monotonicity called communication compatible allocation rule complete information condition consider construction defined denote direct game direct mechanism double auction economic efficient allocation rule environments ex-ante example exists expected payoff feasible finite form allocation rules given implementation problem implementation theory incentive compatible independent types inequality information structures interim efficient interim stage interim utility mechanism design message space mixed strategy multiple equilibrium problem Nash equilibrium Nash implementation normal form games outcome function Palfrey and Srivastava parties planner played player principal private values pure exchange economies random allocation reduced form allocation reported type reporting truthfully requires revelation principle satisfied simply social choice correspondence social choice functions Srivastava 1991b strictly dominated strategies Suppose Theorem 4.1 tion transferable utility truthful strategy type of agent type profiles undominated utility function virtual implementation