Behavioral Social Choice: Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and Applications
Behavioral Social Choice looks at the probabilistic foundations of collective decision-making rules. The authors challenge much of the existing theoretical wisdom about social choice processes, and seek to restore faith in the possibility of democratic decision-making. In particular, they argue that worries about the supposed prevalence of majority rule cycles that would preclude groups from reaching a final decision about what alternative they prefer have been greatly overstated. In practice, majority rule can be expected to work well in most real-world settings. They provide new insights into how alternative model specifications can change our estimates of social orderings.
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Introduction and Summary
The Lack of Theoretical and Practical Support
A General Concept of Majority Rule
On the Model Dependence versus Robustness of Social
Constructing Majority Preferences from Subset Choice Data
Majority Rule in a Statistical Sampling and Bayesian
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approval voting assumptions Bayesian inference behavioral social choice binary preference relations binary relations Chapter choice alternatives Condorcet criterion Condorcet efficiency Condorcet winner correct majority culture of indifference culture over linear data sets distribution of preferences domain restrictions election Equation Figure Fishburn FNES Gehrlein given GNES Grofman impartial culture individual preferences interval orders linear orders majority cycles majority ordering majority outcomes majority preference relation majority relation majority rule majority winner misestimation model dependence NB(a paired comparisons pairwise margins pairwise net probabilities pbBa preference distributions preference majority preference probabilities probabilistic probability distribution probability of cycles random sample random utility representations random variables ranking probabilities Regenwetter satisfied semiorder Sen's value restriction shaded size-independent model social choice theory statistical strict linear order strict majority strict partial orders strict weak orders survey data Theorem three candidates threshold values tion topset voting model transitive majority preference triple value restriction condition value restriction holds violated