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absolute according action actual agency appears apprehend Aristotle Arius attain become Buttenhausen cause character conceived conception condition conformity connexion consciousness consequently considered contradic contradiction contrary course of nature creation creature dark depth derived Descartes desires determined developed distinction Divine doctrine empirical energy entirely Epicurus essence essential eternal existence faculty feeling Fichte finite ginal ground guilt harmony Hence higher highest holy human freedom hypostases idea impossible individual infinite Inquirer knowledge laws of nature Leibnitz liberty light manifestation manner means mind monads moral evil moral law necessary necessity never objects opposition original outward pantheism perfect phantasms phenomena philosophy Philosophy of Mind Plato possible practical reason present principle pure reason regarded relation representations sality Schelling self-determination self-subsistence sense soul speculations speculative reason Spinoza spirit striving supposition things Tholuck thought timate tion true truth universal whilst whole word
Page 48 - I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner : liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent, as for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments, and though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power,...
Page 173 - Idealogie), a word which could only properly suggest an a priori scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from the senses...
Page 137 - A moral Evil is an evil that has its origin in a "Will. An evil common to all must have a ground common to all. But the actual existence of moral evil we are bound in conscience to admit; and that there is an evil common, to all is a fact; and this evil must therefore have a common ground. N"ow this evil ground cannot originate in the Divine Will: it must therefore be referred to the will of man.
Page 181 - Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things.
Page 22 - There is a philosophic (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness, which lies beneath or (as it were) behind the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the .other side of the spontaneous consciousness ; citra et trans conscientiam communem.
Page 172 - Gassendi, the word under such imposing patronage gradually won its way into general use. In England, however, Locke may be said to have been the first who naturalized the term in its Cartesian universality. Hobbes employs it, and that historically, only once or twice ; Henry More and Cudworth are very chary of it, even when treating of the Cartesian philosophy ; Willis rarely uses it ; while Lord Herbert, Reynolds, and the English philosophers in general, between Descartes and Locke, do not apply...
Page 21 - understanding," I mean the faculty of thinking and forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure
Page 28 - Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likeness of his Maker, resembleth him also in the manner of working; so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do wittingly work and freely; neither are we according to the manner of natural agents any way so tied ao but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone.