Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States
Bureaucracies have been criticized from various perspectives and blamed for a variety of failings. Critics have claimed that bureaucracies are too focused on conforming to rules rather than achieving an organization‚ s core mission. Bureaucracies are said to oppress human freedom because of their orientation toward hierarchical control. Bureaucratic organizations are also said to be unable to deal effectively with public problems that span multiple administrative jurisdictions; they do not reach beyond their own organizational boundaries. This book provides solid data on how bureaucracies can expedite information processing and reduce organizational conflicts. Jay Eungha Ryu finds that the functions of bureaucracies are highly dependent upon external political conditions. Whether the executive and legislative branches are dominated by the same party significantly influences the ability of bureaucracies to function effectively. Ryu notes that the merits of bureaucratic centralization are worth close attention. Numerous attempts, including performance budgeting systems, have been made to improve bureaucratic malfunctions. However, such reform initiatives are doomed to failure, he argues, unless they employ a core feature of bureaucracy itself, centralization. Ryu defines bureaucratic centralization at its best as bounded bureaucracy. If well managed, bounded bureaucracy can substantially improve the rational behavior of organizations and reduce institutional frictions.
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Bounded Rationality in Policy and Budget Processes
Bureaucratic Organizations as a Remedy to Bounded Rationality
Bureaucratic Centralization and the National Executive Budget Process
Bureaucratic Centralization and the Congressional Budget Process
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agency budget requests analytical capacities Appropriations Committee balanced budget requirements BO staffs bounded rationality budget base budget choices budget decision makers budget environments budget inertia budget information budget outcomes budget punctuations budget resolutions budget stability budgetary incrementalism bureaucratic centralization bureaucratic organizations capacity of budget CBO’s central budget offices Central Capacity Load Congressional budget coordination decision environment decision procedures disproportionate information-processing theory divided governments dynamic scoring enhance equation 2.5 executive agencies executive branch executive budget process executive budgeting systems expedite information processing fiscal frequency of budget Fry and Raadschelders functions governors gubernatorial increases information-processing capacity item veto legislative budget line-item veto main budget actors normal distributions OMB staffs organizational partisan configurations PAYGO percent policy or budget political president’s probability of budget processing and reduce programs Raadschelders 2008 reduce institutional frictions revenue Senate split branch governments split legislature governments tion U.S. budget authorities unified governments variables