Bounded rational behavior in experimental games and markets: proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21-25, 1986, Volume 1986
Reinhard Tietz, Wulf Albers, Reinhard Selten, Universität Bielefeld. Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung
Springer-Verlag, 1988 - Business & Economics - 368 pages
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
19 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
ABC coalition adaptive expectations agreement alternation analysis aspiration levels assume assumption auction periods average bargaining chains bargaining games bargaining set bargaining theory bidders bids Binmore bounded rational characteristic function choice coalition formation coefficient common value auction concept concession condition cooperative decision maker demand denoted deviations effect equal excess model equal surplus equilibrium equity theory evaluative expected value experiment Experimental Economics forecasts frequencies game theoretic grand coalition hypothesis increase individual inputs investment Journal justice norms Komorita maximal mean mediator mental representation motivation multistage Nash equilibrium negotiation observed optimal orientation type outcomes parameter player points predictions probability profits Psychology public information QRANK quota values rational expectations reciprocal loyalty regression reward division round SELTEN shares signal significant significantly situation social solution solution concept strategy structure subjects Table target system Tietz tion tokens trial two-person variance VRANK winner's curse