Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia: Collective Goods, Selective Incentives, and Predatory States
This book examines the development of business interest representation in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The central argument is that abusive regulatory regimes discourage the formation of business associations. At the same time, poor regulatory enforcement tends to encourage associational membership growth. Academic research often treats special interest groups as vehicles of protectionism and non-productive collusion. This book challenges this perspective with evidence of market-friendly activities of industry associations as well as their benign influence on patterns of public governance. Careful analysis of cross-national quantitative data that spans more than 25 countries, as well as the qualitative examination of the development of business associations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Croatia, shows that postcommunist business associations function as substitutes for state and private mechanisms of economic governance. They challenge corrupt bureaucracy and contribute to the establishment of effective and predictable regulatory regimes. These arguments and empirical findings put the long-standing issues of economic regulations, public goods, and collective action in a new theoretical perspective.
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Collective Action in Adverse Business Environments
PostCommunist Business Representation in
normalized by GDP
Business Associations in Action
Compulsory versus Voluntary Membership
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activities Almaty analysis asso association’s associational membership beneﬁts bribery bribes bureaucratic business asso business representation certiﬁcation chambers of commerce chapter ciations collective action compulsory corporatism corporatist cost of regulatory Croatian cross-national defensive organization economic Employers enforcement enterprises Entrepreneurs ﬁgures ﬁnancial ﬁnd ﬁnding ﬁrm’s ﬁrms ﬁrst Freedom House functions Hypothesis inﬂuence institutions instrumental variable interest groups Kazakh business associations Kazakhstan labor levels lobbying mechanisms member beneﬁts ness associations ofﬁce ofﬁcial regulatory ofthe Orange Revolution organizational participation in business percent political post-communist business associations post-communist countries Producers red tape reﬂect Regional Yes regulations regulatory burden regulatory compliance regulatory costs regulatory environment regulatory regimes rent-seeking RUIE Russian business associations sector selective incentives signiﬁcant Slovakia Slovenia speciﬁcity survey tions trade transition Transparency International Ukraine Ukrainian business associations Union unofﬁcial variables voluntary voluntary associations voluntary-membership World Bank Yes National Yes