Business and the State in Developing Countries
Sylvia Maxfield, Ben Ross Schneider
Cornell University Press, 1997 - Business & Economics - 348 pages
Much of the current debate about development has pitted proponents of unfettered markets against advocates of developmental states. Yet, often what best explains variations in economic performance among developing countries is not markets or states but rather the character of relations between business and government. The contributors to Business and the State in Developing Countries identify a range of close, collaborative relations between bureaucrats and capitalists which enhance elements of economic performance and defy conventional expectations that such relations lead ineluctably to rent-seeking, corruption, and collusion.
All based on extensive field research, the essays contrast collaborative and collusive relations in a wide range of developing countries, most of them in Latin America and Asia, and isolate the conditions under which collaboration is most likely to emerge and survive. The contributors highlight the crucial roles played by capable bureaucracies and strong business associations.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Business the State and Economic Performance
Theories of Business and BusinessState Relations
Bus1ness Organ1zat1on F1rm Structure
Strong States and Business Organization in Korea
Business Elites the State and Economic Change in Chile
Other editions - View all
actors Amsden argues asso Author interview auto Bangkok Bank banks benefits Brazil bureaucrats business associations business community business groups business-government business-state relations businesspeople businesspersons capacity capital capital flight capitalists chaebol Chapter Chicago boys Chile Chinese clientelism coffee collaboration collective action Colombia competition concertation conglomerates corporatism costs credibility crisis developing countries developmental effective embedded autonomy embeddedness example exchange export firms growth Haggard implementation important incentives and subsidies industrial policy institutional institutionalized insulated interaction interests investment Korea and Taiwan labor leaders light manufacturing macroeconomic Maxfield ment Mexico Ministry monitoring Muscat negotiations neoliberal ness networks nomic organization peak associations percent policymakers political private sector production promote reform regime relationship rent seeking restructuring rice Santiago de Chile Schneider Shafer social South Korea state-business state's strategy structure Taiwan technocrats textile Thai Thailand Thorp and Durand tion trade trust Venezuela Weberian Weberian bureaucracy World Bank