Cash Transfers, Conditions, School Enrollment, and Child Work: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Ecuador
World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Services Team, 2006 - School attendance - 29 pages
"The impact of cash transfer programs on the accumulation of human capital is a topic of great policy importance. An attendant question is whether program effects are larger when transfers are "conditioned" on certain behaviors, such as a requirement that households enroll their children in school. This paper uses a randomized study design to analyze the impact of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a cash transfer program, on enrollment and child work among poor children in Ecuador. There are two main results. First, the BDH program had a large, positive impact on school enrollment, about 10 percentage points, and a large, negative impact on child work, about 17 percentage points. Second, the fact that some households believed that there was a school enrollment requirement attached to the transfers, even though such a requirement was never enforced or monitored in Ecuador, helps explain the magnitude of program effects.."--World Bank web site.
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1309 Household Angrist banking records baseline and follow-up baseline survey BDH lottery BDH program effects Bono Solidario canton fixed effects capita expenditures cash transfer programs Child is enrolled coefficient on lottery conditional cash transfer conditioned and unconditioned control group controls and canton controls Extended controls convergence problems David McKenzie Descriptive statistics dummy variable Ecuador education is missing enrolled at baseline enrolled in school enrollment and child enrollment rates enrollment regressions enrollment requirement extended set Flewitt follow-up survey Fraction of household Head of household household expenditures household members ages instrumental variables estimates Linear probability model lottery effects lottery losers lottery winners Mother's education outcomes percent level percentage points poverty line receive BDH transfers received transfers robust standard error samples of conditioned school enrollment set of controls study sample Table Tobit Tobit model treatment and control unconditioned households variable for lottery winners and losers winning the BDH within-sibling correlations World Bank