Charity With Choice
R. Mark Issac, Doug Norton
Emerald Group Publishing, Mar 23, 2010 - Social Science - 276 pages
Four years ago "Research in Experimental Economics" published experimental evidence on fundraising and charitable contributions. This volume returns to the intrigue with philanthropy. Employing a mixture of laboratory and field experiments as well as theoretical research we present this new volume, "Charity with Choice". New waves of experiments are taking advantage of well calibrated environments established by past efforts to add new features to experiments such as endogeneity and self-selection. Adventurous new research programs are popping up and some of them are captured here in this volume. Among the major themes in which the tools of choice, endogeneity, and self-selection are employed are: What increases or decreases charitable activity? and How do organizational and managerial issues affect the performance of non-profit organizations?
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Chapter 3 The efficiencyequality tradeoff in public sector charity provision
Chapter 4 Retained earnings maximizing nonprofit enterprises
Chapter 5 Endogenous production technology in a public goods enterprise
Chapter 6 What can social preferences tell us about charitable giving? Evidence on responses to price of giving matching and rebates
Chapter 7 Charity auctions in the experimental lab
24 Period active bidders all-pay auctions amount Baseline behavior bucket charity auctions Charity Navigators choice coefficient compassionate social surplus customers decisions donations Double Pay Period effects efficiency maximizers EMUs endogenous endowment equilibrium with positive experiment Experimental Economics first-price G ¼ GINI coefficients Group Account group enterprise GVSM GVSM’s incentive to deviate income income redistribution increase individual inequity averters Isaac Journal labor earnings Laffer curve leisure seconds Lemma loss averse manager manager’s Mark Isaac matching and rebate mechanism MPCR Nash equilibrium nonprofit organizations option p-value participants payoff player i e positive contributions prediction price of giving productivity rebate subsidies redistribution reduce her contribution Regular Pay Periods REM enterprise revenue round second-price Section self-interested sessions significantly social preference social surplus maximizers strategies subjects theoretical winner-pay