China's evolving managerial labor market
University of California, San Diego, Dept. of Economics, 1992 - Business & Economics - 29 pages
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1992 Kyle Bagwell adverse selection Allocative Efficiency appointment Artificial Neural Networks bidder bureaucratic change of manager China Chinese state-owned Clive Granger Cointegration competitive auctions Coordination Games DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS dependent variables DISCUSSION PAPERS 1992 dummy Economic Reform ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS Engle estimated ex ante poor Explanation of Managerial firm performance firm's potential Firms Group firms whose managers fixed effects Garey Ramey Halbert White Hong improvement in performance incentives incumbent manager industrial bureau Manager Selection Effects manager was demoted manager's job manager's pay managerial labor market managerial resource managerial selection managerial wages McMillan Naughton output per worker Performance Shift Planned Economy poor performance poorly post-contract potential managers previous manager principal-agent probit model profits and sales regression shows relationship relative performance Robert F Rockell sales and profits sales profits squared sales squared sales sample security deposit selected by auction selecting managers September 1992 state-owned enterprises t-statistic turnover University of California Yongmiao