Clavis Universalis

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Page 1 - Clavis Universalis; or a new Inquiry after Truth: being a demonstration of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world.
Page 137 - To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive.
Page 12 - I believe that infinite worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather merely created,) mind were ever in being. And, as in fact there are thousands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there is an Universe, or Material World in being, which is, at least, numerically different from every material world perceived by mere creatures. By this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of created (or rather twice created) matter, by which all things are produced ; or rather, (as my...
Page 136 - ... smells, pain, etc., God would, without question, deserve to be regarded as a deceiver, if he directly and of himself presented to our mind the idea of this extended matter, or merely caused it to be presented to us by some object which possessed neither extension, figure, nor motion.
Page 12 - Lastly, when I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but necessarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished by the proper names of John, Peter, &c. I have no design to affirm, that every part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must needs exist in some created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe that infinite worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather merely created,) mind were ever in being.
Page 12 - World. Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which this question seems already to be reduced, I find myself necessitated to divide it into two. For, in order to prove that there is no External World, it must needs be one article to shew that the visible world is not external ; and when this is done, though in this all be indeed done which relates to any opinion yet...
Page 93 - This is evident from the foregoing article, which shews the absolute necessity of its being infinite, on the supposition of the being of but the least part or particle of it : for certainly if nothing less than infinite can exist, or be made, no part of this infinite can be unmade, or annihilated. And therefore though in words we may say that God can annihilate any part of it, yet we utter that in words, of which we can have no cenception, but rather the contrary to it.
Page 10 - I shall desire leave to call it) quasi externeity of visible objects, is not only the effect of the will of God (as it is his will that light and colours should seem to be without the soul, that heat should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.), but also that it is a natural and necessary condition of their visibility. I would say that though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one visible object, which is granted to be not external, yet by the condition of its being seen it would...
Page 133 - That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible...
Page 110 - And now I hope this objection is fully answered. But I expect another in its place, (which is near about the same as to force and consequence,) and that is to be told. Objection 3. That the late judicious Mr. Norris, who (in his Ideal World, vol. i. chap, iv.) purposely considered this question of an external world, was yet so far from concluding as I have here done, that he declares it to be no other than errant scepticism to make a serious doubt or question of its existence. Answer. I have chosen...

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