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von NeumannMorgenstern Solution
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A-pattern games assume Aumann-Maschler axioms bargaining set behaviour belonging Caplow characteristic function choose the pure coalition forms coalition proper compatibility relation components condition counter-objection Daniel Bernoulli defined denote dominates the imputation elementary events equal equilibrium point essential triad finite form a coalition game theory game variants given Hence heretical imputation inequality interdependence Leiserson Lemma max u(x maximize maximum mean utility minimax theorem Neumann-Morgenstern theory normal form obtain Obviously optimum p(xr p(yj partition pattern variants player 1 chooses preferred Prisoner's Dilemma probability space proper coalition pure strategy random correspondence random strategy reduced form respective coalition respectively satisfied set of imputations set of players Shapley value situation stage strategy of player strategy x strongly interactive solution subset subsystems three players tion total coalition triad in reduced triad R2 two-person game two-person zero-sum game uncertainty utility to player vector weighted entropy zero zero-sum triads