Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-up Constraints
Nova Publishers, 2005 - 217 σελίδες
The issue of the cognitive impenetrability or penetrability of perception lay dormant for a long period of time. Though philosophers reacted to the relativism implied by the work of Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, they concentrated their efforts in dealing with the danger of the incommensurability of theories. They tried to show by philosophical and detailed historical analysis that scientists within different paradigms do communicate with each other and put their respective theories to the empirical test. Curiously enough the same philosophers did not seek to examine the very foundation of the relativistic trend, namely the thesis that perception is cognitively penetrable and theory-laden. In the last decade there has been a keen interest in studying the cognition/perception boundary. However, the discussion focused mainly on the grounding of conceptual content on perception and on the embodiment of cognition. The repercussions of these issues for the problem of the cognitive effects on perception were largely ignored. The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception. different perspective. Eight of the chapters were written by philosophers and cognitive scientists, and three by psychologists and neuropsychologists. These differences notwithstanding, the chapters share many common themes. The role of attention in perception, the contribution of action to perception, the relation between perception and scientific data, the examination of the content of perception and its nature and the detailed examination of the ways background knowledge affects perception, are among these themes. Most chapters combine philosophical analysis with psychological and/or neuropsychological evidence, which shows that there is consensus as to the kind of approaches that are currently deemed necessary for an adequate examination of the problem.
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VECTOR COMPLETION RELEVANT ABDUCTIONAND THE CAPACITY FOR GLOBALLY SENSITIVE INFERENCE
THE COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY OF PERCEPTION
TOPDOWN AND BOTTOMUP INFLUENCES ON OBSERVATIONEVIDENCE FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF SCI...
ON THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THEORYDEPENDENT EVIDENCE
PERCEPTUAL SYSTEMS AND A VIABLE FORM OF REALISM
THE MIND IN PICTURESPERCEPTUAL STRATEGIES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF VISUAL ART
MOLYNEUXS QUESTION AND COGNITIVE IMPENETRABILITY
action activity apraxics argue argument assumptions attentional selection background knowledge beliefs bottom-up brain Cambridge causal change blindness Churchland claim cognitive penetrability cognitive psychology Cognitive Science computational constructivism detect discussion ecological validity encapsulated environment evidence example feedforward Fodor function grasp impenetrability inattentional blindness input internal representation internalist involved issue Lamme learning mechanisms memory modularity motor natural neural neurons neuroscience neutrinos nonconceptual content Nova Science Publishers observation on-line control optic ataxia output penetrability of perception perceive perceptual experience perceptual processing perceptual systems phenomenal Philosophy of Science pictorial interpretation problem properties of objects propositional knowledge Raftopoulos recognitional capacity recognize recurrent interactions reference relation relevant role saccadic scene Schier scientific scientists semantic sense sensory shape concepts spatial specific stimuli structure task theory theory-laden things top-down effects University Press V-perception vision visual awareness visual perception visual processing visual system