Collective Action

Front Cover
Routledge, Dec 3, 2015 - Political Science - 268 pages

Public choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions.
As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest.
In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns.
This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts.

 

Selected pages

Contents

GROUP SIZE
3
TYPES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
ASYMMETRIES IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
CONTRACTARIAN PROVISIONS
EXTRARATIONAL MOTIVATIONS
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
RATIONALITY IN THE PRISONERS DILEMMA
CONTRACT BY CONVENTION
ENFORCEMENT OF CONVENTIONS
LIMITS TO CONTRACT BY CONVENTION
CONTRACT BY CONVENTION IN SOCIAL THEORY
CONTRACT BY CONVENTION IN POLITICS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Collective Action
Russell Hardin
Limited preview - 2015
Collective Action
Professor Department of Politics Russell Hardin,Russell Hardin
No preview available - 2016

Common terms and phrases

2-person Prisoner’s achieve activity American Anatol Rapoport argues argument assumption asymmetry behavior Brian Barry by-product theory choice collective action collective action problems collective bads collective benefits commonly compelling conform contexts contingent choosing contract by convention contractarian contributions cooperation coordination equilibria coordination game costs and benefits defect discussed in chapter Economics effect effort environmental environmentalists equilibrium example expect explain extrarational fair firms game theory group action Hence Ibid increases individual interactions interest groups involve issue iterated Prisoner's Dilemma large groups latent groups less level of supply lobbying logic of collective matrix million moral motivations narrowly rational norm Olson one-shot one’s ongoing organizations outcome paradox participation payoff perhaps Petersburg Paradox play players political pollution possible preferences Prisoner’s Dilemma provision relationships relevant rule sanctions Schelling selective incentives sense Sierra Club single-play Social exchange theory stag hunt static subgroup substantial suppose vote

About the author (2015)

Russell Hardin is professor of politics at New York University. His recent books include Indeterminacy and Society and Trust and Trustworthiness.

Bibliographic information

TitleCollective Action
AuthorRussell Hardin
Editionreprint
PublisherRoutledge, 2015
ISBN1135433097, 9781135433093
Length268 pages
Subjects › 

Business & Economics / Environmental Economics
Law / International
Nature / Ecology
Political Science / Constitutions
Political Science / General
Science / Environmental Science
  
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