Public choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions. As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest. In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns. This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts.
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DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
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2person Prisoner’s Dilemma achieve activity Anatol Rapoport argues argument assumption asymmetry behavior Brian Barry byproduct theory choice collective action problems collective bads collective benefits commonly compelling contexts contingent choosing contract by convention contractarian contributions cooperation coordination equilibria coordination game costs and benefits defect discussed in chapter effort environmental environmentalists equilibrium example exchange expect explain extrarational fair fallacy of composition firms game theory group action Hence Ibid individual individual’s interactions interest groups involve issue iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma large groups largescale latent groups less level of supply Lewis’s logic of collective matrix moral motivations narrow selfinterest narrowly rational norm Olson’s one’s oneshot ongoing organizations outcome paradox payoff perhaps persuasive definition Petersburg Paradox play players political pollution possible provision relevant rule sanctions Schelling’s selective incentives selfinterest sense Sierra Club singleplay Prisoner’s Dilemma smallnumber social Social exchange theory stag hunt static subgroup substantial vote welloff women’s