Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public ChoiceVoting is often the most public and visible example of mass collective decision-making. But how do we define a collective decision? And how do we classify and evaluate the modes by which collective decisions are made? This book examines these crucial ques |
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Contents
Defining a Collective Decision | 3 |
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures | 9 |
Economic Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decisions | 23 |
General Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decision Procedures | 35 |
Relative Advantages of Modes of Making Collective Decisions | 43 |
What is a Good Collective Decision? | 57 |
Voting | 75 |
An Overview of Voting | 77 |
The Arrow Theorem | 123 |
Strategic Voting and the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem | 143 |
Criteria for Evaluating RankingBased VoteProcessing Rules | 149 |
Alternatives to Plurality | 165 |
minimal strategies under approval voting for 87 elections | 173 |
minimal strategies under the Copeland rule for 87 elections | 209 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting One Option from a Continuum of One or More Dimensions When Votes Have Predetermined Weights | 245 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting More than One Candidate When Votes | 263 |
Majority Rule and its Weighted Analog | 83 |
Voting Cycles | 93 |
of relative distance from the center of a diagonal | 106 |
Vote Processing Rules With Endogenous Weights for Selfinterested | 289 |
Lessons from the Excursion | 321 |
Other editions - View all
Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice Nicolaus Tideman Limited preview - 2017 |
Common terms and phrases
87 elections adjusted Borda score ahead alternative vote approval voting Arrow theorem Bucklin voting Chapter choice Clarke taxes components Condorcet consistency consensus continuum CPO-STV cycles demand-revealing process dimensions Dodgson score dominant option eliminated evaluate Example Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem GOCHA set incentive income effects independence of clones individual invariant loss consistency majority rule matrix of majorities maximin rule monotonicity MSD rule mutual majority consistency Nanson rule Nicolaus Tideman number of candidates number of voters one-way streets paired comparisons pairs of options Pareto perfect-tie responsiveness plurality positive responsiveness possible preferences properties qualitative attractiveness random process range voting ranked pairs rule RBVPR resistance to strategy resolvability rule lacks rule possesses Schulze method Schwartz consistency sequence of rankings set of options Single Transferable Vote Smith consistency Smith set social welfare function Thompson insurance mechanism three options two-ballot majority universal domain vote-processing rule voting procedures weighted Condorcet rule winner winning option Young rule
Bibliographic information
| Title | Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice |
| Author | Nicolaus Tideman |
| Edition | illustrated, reprint |
| Publisher | Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006 |
| ISBN | 075464717X, 9780754647171 |
| Length | 335 pages |
| Subjects | › › Political Science / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |