Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public ChoiceVoting is often the most public and visible example of mass collective decision-making. But how do we define a collective decision? And how do we classify and evaluate the modes by which collective decisions are made? This book examines these crucial ques |
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Contents
Defining a Collective Decision | 3 |
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures | 9 |
Economic Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decisions | 23 |
General Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decision Procedures | 35 |
Relative Advantages of Modes of Making Collective Decisions | 43 |
What is a Good Collective Decision? | 57 |
Voting | 75 |
An Overview of Voting | 77 |
The Arrow Theorem | 123 |
Strategic Voting and the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem | 143 |
Criteria for Evaluating RankingBased VoteProcessing Rules | 149 |
Alternatives to Plurality | 165 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting One Option from a Continuum of One or More Dimensions When Votes Have Predetermined Weights | 245 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting More than One Candidate When Votes | 263 |
Vote Processing Rules With Endogenous Weights for SelfInterested | 289 |
Lessons from the Excursion | 321 |
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Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice Nicolaus Tideman Limited preview - 2017 |
Common terms and phrases
achieve agree agreement ahead alternative approval Arrow attractive authority beats Borda candidates Chapter choice chosen collective decision combinativity compensation components computation Condorcet Condorcet consistency Condorcet rule consensus considered continuum cost cycles defined definition determine dimensions discussion Dodgson dominant efficiency election element eliminated equality estimate evaluating Example expected fact favor function give given greater idea identify implies independence of clones individuals involved least less limited loss majority consistency majority rule matrix of majorities means measure mechanism method mode monotonicity needed options outcome paired comparisons pairs person plurality positive possesses possible preferences probability procedure properties proposal provides question random rankings RBVPR reason receive represented require resolvability respect result satisfy Schwartz score sequence shows Smith social strategy Suppose theorem trade transferred true voters voting weighted winner winning