Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public ChoiceVoting is often the most public and visible example of mass collective decision-making. But how do we define a collective decision? And how do we classify and evaluate the modes by which collective decisions are made? This book examines these crucial ques |
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Contents
Defining a Collective Decision | 3 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting More than One Candidate When Votes | 15 |
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures | 21 |
Economic Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decisions | 23 |
General Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decision Procedures | 34 |
Relative Advantages of Modes of Making Collective Decisions | 43 |
What is a Good Collective Decision? | 57 |
Voting | 75 |
Voting Cycles | 97 |
The Arrow Theorem | 123 |
Strategic Voting and the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem | 143 |
Criteria for Evaluating RankingBased VoteProcessing Rules | 149 |
Alternatives to Plurality | 165 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting One Option from a Continuum of | 242 |
or More Dimensions When Votes Have Predetermined Weights | 245 |
Vote Processing Rules With Endogenous Weights for SelfInterested | 289 |
An Overview of Voting | 77 |
Majority Rule and its Weighted Analog | 83 |
Lessons from the Excursion | 321 |
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Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice Nicolaus Tideman Limited preview - 2017 |
Common terms and phrases
achieve additional agree agreement ahead alternative approval Arrow attractive authority beats better Borda candidates Chapter choice chosen clones collective decision combinativity components computation Condorcet consistency Condorcet rule consensus considered cost cycles defined definition determine dimensions discussion dominant economic efficiency elections element eliminated equality estimate evaluating Example expected fact favor function give given greater idea identify implies independence of clones individuals involved lacks least limited loss majority consistency majority rule matrix of majorities means mode monotonicity mutual majority needed options outcome paired comparisons pairs person plurality positive positive responsiveness possesses possible preferences probability procedure properties proposal provides random rankings RBVPR reason receive require resolvability respect result rule lacks satisfy score sequence of rankings shows social strategy Suppose theorem tied trade true voters voting weighted welfare winner winning