Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice

Front Cover
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006 - Political Science - 335 pages
0 Reviews
Reviews aren't verified, but Google checks for and removes fake content when it's identified
Voting is often the most public and visible example of mass collective decision-making. But how do we define a collective decision? And how do we classify and evaluate the modes by which collective decisions are made? This book examines these crucial ques
 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

Defining a Collective Decision
3
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures
9
Economic Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decisions
23
General Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decision Procedures
35
Relative Advantages of Modes of Making Collective Decisions
43
What is a Good Collective Decision?
57
Voting
75
An Overview of Voting
77
The Arrow Theorem
123
Strategic Voting and the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem
143
Criteria for Evaluating RankingBased VoteProcessing Rules
149
Alternatives to Plurality
165
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting One Option from a Continuum of One or More Dimensions When Votes Have Predetermined Weights
245
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting More than One Candidate When Votes
263
Vote Processing Rules With Endogenous Weights for SelfInterested
289
Lessons from the Excursion
321

Majority Rule and its Weighted Analog
83
Voting Cycles
93
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice
Nicolaus Tideman
Limited preview - 2017
Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice
Nicolaus Tideman
Snippet view - 2006

Common terms and phrases

achieve agree agreement ahead alternative approval Arrow attractive authority beats Borda candidates Chapter choice chosen collective decision combinativity compensation components computation Condorcet Condorcet consistency Condorcet rule consensus considered continuum cost cycles defined definition determine dimensions discussion Dodgson dominant efficiency election element eliminated equality estimate evaluating Example expected fact favor function give given greater idea identify implies independence of clones individuals involved least less limited loss majority consistency majority rule matrix of majorities means measure mechanism method mode monotonicity needed options outcome paired comparisons pairs person plurality positive possesses possible preferences probability procedure properties proposal provides question random rankings RBVPR reason receive represented require resolvability respect result satisfy Schwartz score sequence shows Smith social strategy Suppose theorem trade transferred true voters voting weighted winner winning

References to this book

About the author (2006)

Nicolaus Tideman is Professor of Economics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, in Blacksburg, Virginia, USA. He has been there since 1973, as a post-doctoral fellow, Associate Professor, and Professor since 1985. He has published many professional articles, primarily in the areas of urban economics, public finance, efficient public decision-making, and economic justice.

Bibliographic information

QR code for Collective Decisions and Voting
TitleCollective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice
AuthorNicolaus Tideman
Editionillustrated, reprint
PublisherAshgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006
ISBN075464717X, 9780754647171
Length335 pages
Subjects ›  › 

Political Science / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections
  
Export CitationBiBTeX EndNote RefMan