Coming of age in a corporate law firm: the implicit contract for associates
Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Stanford University. School of Law, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics (Stanford University)
Stanford Law School, 1988 - Law - 49 pages
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
analysis apprenticeship period approach associate career patterns associate's abilities associate's investment associate's performance associate's perspective associate's uncertainty become partners behave opportunistically clients col.l concerning the associate's considered for partnership consolation prize CONTRACT FOR ASSOCIATES corporate law firms critical dividing profits dual uncertainty Econ Economics eliminate employee lawyer employment evaluated firm specific capital firm specific human Gilson & Mnookin governing associate career historical dominance information asymmetry initially hired investment in firm law firm organization Law School meet partnership standards monitor explanation Nexus of Contracts non-partner number of associates opportunism outplacement partner profit partnership decision percentage of associates permanent associate pool of associates problem productivity promoted to partner puzzle reduce the risk reducing associate risk reputation model risk averse risk sharing Samuel Butler service firms sharing and incentives specific human capital standards for partnership Stanford Law School supra note 26 Swaine & Moore traditional transaction cost up-or-out system winner's curse