Comparing Voting Systems
In many contexts of everyday life we find ourselves faced with the problem of reconciling the views of several persons. These problems are usually solved by resorting to some opinion aggre gating procedure, like voting. Very often the problem is thought of as being solved after the decision to take a vote has been made and the ballots have been counted. Most official decision making bodies have formally instituted procedures of voting but in informal groups such procedures are typically chosen in casu. Curiously enough people do not seem to pay much attention to which particular procedure is being resorted to as long as some kind of voting takes place. As we shall see shortly the procedure being used often makes a great difference to the voting outcomes. Thus, the Question arises as to which voting procedure is best. This book is devoted to a discussion of this problem in the light of various criteria of optimality. We shall deal with a number of procedures that have been proposed for use or are actually in use in voting contexts. The aim of this book is to give an evaluation of the virtues and shortcomings of these procedures. On the basis of this evaluation the reader will hopefully be able to determine which procedure is optimal for the decision setting that he or she has in mind.
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agenda alternative set amendment procedure approval voting assume assumption ballot binary Borda count Borda score Borda winner Brams candidate chosen complete and transitive Condorcet criteria Condorcet loser Condorcet loser criterion Condorcet paradox Condorcet winner Condorcet winning criterion considered contest Coombs Copeland defeated Dodgson's method dorcet eliminated ence erence Fishburn following example given Hence individual preferences intuitively majority cycle manipulable maximin method monotonicity criterion Nanson's method number of alternatives number of voters Nurmi obviously outcome pairwise comparisons Pareto dominated Pareto optimality person 1 person plausible plurality runoff plurality voting preference changes preference misrepresentation preference profile preference relation problem procedure satisfies properties ranked alternative requirement result satisfy the Condorcet Schwartz seats set of alternatives simple majority sincere preference truncation social choice function social choice theory strong monotonicity strong Pareto condition subset Suppose theorem tion true preferences violated voters 2 voters voting body voting procedures WARP weak Pareto