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Regulatory Unions among Asymmetric Regulators
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analysis assumption asymmetric countries bank regulation banks chartered beneficial benefit function benefit of coordinating benefit to regulator capital adequacy ratio capital requirement centralized regulator centralized solution choose to form competition among regulators context costs country's banks cross-border activities decreasing degree of financial degrees of regulatory different regulatory domestic banking system domestic regulators effect envelope theorem equation equilibrium example expression is negative externalities in regulation financial markets focus foreign banks form a regulatory higher regulatory standards impact of increased impact of regulation implies impose different increased regulation independent national regulators independent regulators individual regulators level of integration level of regulation loss of flexibility lower regulatory standards marginal impact multiple regulators Nash equilibrium negotiated outcome objective function optimal order conditions paper Pareto improvement positive previous section Proof reaction functions regularity conditions regulators prefer regulatory benefit regulatory capture regulatory instruments relative safety and soundness second term stability under-regulate WLOG