Competition and institutional change: privatization in China
City University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Business, Dept. of Economics and Finance, 1998 - Business & Economics - 32 pages
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action game after-tax residual shares ardized Beijing bicycles bureaucrats central government China Reform Foundation China Statistical Yearbook Chinese economic reform City University COEs competition is sufficiently competition triggers control rights corner solutions county under evaluation cross-regional competition decentralization policy Department of Economics distribution effect Economics and Finance effect of competition efficiency erect trade barriers factors firms Gao Qiang government i's Guangdong incentive effect induce industrial census data Jiangsu joint ventures Kong Stock Exchange Liaoning linear city lower-level governments manager i's managerial market share maximize neighboring counties nonstate sector objective function participation constraint prefecture price game private sector privatization in China product market competition profits property rights Proportion of revenue protectionism province provincial level public ownership regional governments residual claims residual sharing game sets the after-tax Shanghai share-holding state-owned enterprises subgame perfect equilibrium sufficiently intense symmetric equilibrium tax revenue total revenue transition economies triggers privatization TVEs University of Hong