## Compliance Quantified: An Introduction to Data VerificationInternational agreements, such as those governing arms control and the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification so that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process is regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to model it mathematically. One such model can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of noncooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel Prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. Here, the authors introduce the required theory gradually, in the context of specific, real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics. The book will be accessible to a broad range of scientists and nonscientists, in industrial, academic and governmental environments. |

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### Other editions - View all

Compliance Quantified: An Introduction to Data Verification Rudolf Avenhaus,Morton John Canty No preview available - 2005 |

Compliance Quantified: An Introduction to Data Verification Rudolf Avenhaus,Morton John Canty No preview available - 1996 |

### Common terms and phrases

assume attributes sampling Avenhaus balance periods behave legally boundary conditions chapter choose covariance matrix critical region D-statistic D-test data falsiﬁcation deﬁned deﬁnition detection probability determined equation equilibrium strategy equivalent expected payoff expected value fact false alarm probability falsiﬁcation strategy ﬁnite ﬁrst ﬁxed fulﬁlled function game theory given guaranteed detection probability hand side Hatﬁeld IAEA illegal behavior independent inspectee inspectee’s inspection effort inspection strategies inspector’s optimal interim inspections inventory periods ith class justiﬁed legal behavior material accountancy material balance McCoy measurement mixed strategy Nash equilibrium non-cooperative game non-detection probability normally distributed nuclear null hypothesis on-site inspection operator operator’s optimal strategy parameters players plutonium probability of detection proof pure strategies random variables random vector reported data saddle point criteria saddle point strategies safeguards sample sizes satisﬁed signiﬁcant solution speciﬁc subgame perfect equilibrium test statistic Theorem total falsiﬁcation variables sampling variance veriﬁcation veriﬁcation problems zero-sum game