Concentrated Corporate Ownership
Randall K. Morck
University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2007 - Business & Economics - 394 pages
Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.
What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms?
Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
abnormal returns agency costs analysis assets banks Bebchuk billionaire block investors buyout Canada Canadian Canadian firms capital gains capital markets cash flows cash-flow rights CCPCs close corporation CMS structures companies concentrated ownership constraints control block controlling shareholder corporate control corporate governance corporate law corporate venture countries courts directors dividends domestic institutional ownership effect a freezeout entrepreneur equity evidence exit Financial Economics firm's freezeout go public group firms heir heir-controlled firms Holderness and Sheehan incentives income independent venture industry initial public offering investment Journal of Financial majority owners managers market power market price median minority shareholders minority shares monitoring Morck ownership structure paper parties partnership percent potential pre-money valuation private benefits problem pyramids rata distributions regressions rent seeking sample self-dealing Shleifer significant tion Tobin's q transactions United valuation variables venture capital VentureOne voting widely held firms Xerox
Page ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.