Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-order Thought Theory of Consciousness

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John Benjamins Publishing, 1996 - Psychology - 220 pages
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This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness. Following the lead of David Rosenthal, the author argues for the so-called 'higher-order thought theory of consciousness'. This theory holds that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at the mental state. In addition, the somewhat controversial claim that consciousness entails self-consciousness is vigorously defended. The approach is mostly 'analytic' in style and draws on important recent work in cognitive science, perception, artificial intelligence, neuropsychology and psychopathology. However, the book also makes extensive use of numerous Kantian insights in arguing for its main theses and, in turn, sheds historical light on Kant's theory of mind. A detailed analysis of the relationships between (self-)consciousness, behavior, memory, intentionality, and de se attitudes are examples of the central topics to be found in this work. (Series A)
 

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Contents

Introduction and Terminology
1
Why the Conscious Making State Must be a Thought
36
Objections and Replies
69
Does Mentality Require Consciousness?
103
Phenomenal States
121
The BEHAVIOR Argument
143
The DE SE Argument
159
The MEMORY Argument
183
Notes
201
Index
216
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The Logic of Affect
Paul Redding
Limited preview - 1999
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