Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-order Thought Theory of Consciousness
This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness. Following the lead of David Rosenthal, the author argues for the so-called 'higher-order thought theory of consciousness'. This theory holds that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at the mental state. In addition, the somewhat controversial claim that consciousness entails self-consciousness is vigorously defended. The approach is mostly 'analytic' in style and draws on important recent work in cognitive science, perception, artificial intelligence, neuropsychology and psychopathology. However, the book also makes extensive use of numerous Kantian insights in arguing for its main theses and, in turn, sheds historical light on Kant's theory of mind. A detailed analysis of the relationships between (self-)consciousness, behavior, memory, intentionality, and de se attitudes are examples of the central topics to be found in this work. (Series A)
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
ability able argued argument awareness behave behavior beliefs and desires blindsight brain causal chapter claim cognitive complex concepts conscious creature conscious experience conscious mental conscious pains conscious rendering conscious system entails conscious thoughts Dennett directed DSAs entails self-consciousness episodic memory example explain FB role first-order Fodor frame problem Gulick HOT theory idea inner sense intentional attitudes intentionality internal introspection involves Kant Kant's Kantian kind language language of thought least Lewis McGinn MEBs mental state conscious meta-psychological thoughts mind Moreover multiple realizability Natsoulas necessary neocortex ness neural nonconscious pains nonconscious phenomenal nonconscious thoughts occurrent belief oneself perceptual perhaps plausible possession possible premise problem Procedural memory propositional qualitative properties question reason relevant rendered conscious representation require consciousness Robo Rosenthal 1986 Rosenthal's scious Searle seems self-ascription sensation sensory sophisticated temporally enduring theory of mind treat understanding visual experience