Contracting over uncertain property rights: evidence from R&D consortium contracts
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, 2005 - Law - 32 pages
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aﬁer appeal appropriability hazards appropriability literature appropriability of IP Background IP cheating Cluster consortia Containing Spillovers Contract R&D contracting parties Coordinator-led R&D decision tree Department of Justice design of contracts disclosure restrictions applied duration of disclosure Economic Analysis Group Electronics SIC 36 enforcement environments exploit ﬁnite ﬁrst place ﬁve Foreground IP hazard function hazard rates hold-up problems imply shorter disclosure impose incomplete contracting indeﬁnite disclosure restrictions Inducing Spillovers industry intellectual property involving IP and Foreground joint venture know-how intensive latent value legalistic gamesmanship licensing Majewski and Williamson member ﬁrms misappropriations modeling suggests optimal disclosure restriction pace of innovation Pairwise comparisons patent thicket proportional hazards model R&D Consortium Contracts R&D partners rates of dissipation realize value v(t reﬂect relative differences restrictions on Background second-order condition shorter disclosure restrictions SIC’s speciﬁc Standards-setting survival analysis susceptible to discrete tax rates third party types of contracts uncertain property rights V(oo