## Contributions to the Theory of Games, Issue 40 |

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### Contents

Introduction l | 1 |

On the Theory of Games of Strategy | 13 |

Countably Infinitely Many Person Games | 43 |

Copyright | |

17 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume 1 Harold William Kuhn,Albert William Tucker Limited preview - 1950 |

### Common terms and phrases

A-stable absolute game atomic game Axiom bargaining characteristic function claim vector components comprehensive strategies conforming imputation consider consists constant-sum game contains contradiction convex convex combination convex set cooperative games core COROLLARY corresponding defined definition denote disjoint dividends dominated element equation exists extreme games final payoff finite solutions five-person follows game G game with three given Gurk Hence heresy implies inequalities intermediate coalitions K-chain Lemma linear majority game maximal minimal winning set n-person games Neumann and Morgenstern Neumann-Morgenstern non-cooperative game obtain paper partition payoff vector play policing imputations possible Princeton prospect space pure strategies result satisfy Section self-policing patterns set of imputations set of players Shapley value simple vector stable set strong solution subset superadditivity Suppose symmetric game syndicate THEOREM Theory of Games three values three-person tion transferable utility unique v(S U T vital set weak top winning coalitions zero zero-sum