What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
On the Theory of Games of Strategy
Countably Infinitely Many Person Games
17 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
A-stable absolute game atomic game Axiom bargaining characteristic function claim vector components comprehensive strategies conforming imputation consider consists constant-sum game contains contradiction convex convex combination convex set cooperative games core COROLLARY corresponding defined definition denote disjoint dividends dominated element equation exists extreme games final payoff finite solutions five-person follows game G game with three given Gurk Hence heresy implies inequalities intermediate coalitions K-chain Lemma linear majority game maximal minimal winning set n-person games Neumann and Morgenstern Neumann-Morgenstern non-cooperative game obtain paper partition payoff vector play policing imputations possible Princeton prospect space pure strategies result satisfy Section self-policing patterns set of imputations set of players Shapley value simple vector stable set strong solution subset superadditivity Suppose symmetric game syndicate THEOREM Theory of Games three values three-person tion transferable utility unique v(S U T vital set weak top winning coalitions zero zero-sum