Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy
How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explains how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO, and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms, and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents, and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina.
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A theory of international organization
A model of informal governance
Informal governance in the IMF
The World Trade Organization
The European Union
Access to IMF resources
Conditionality under IMF programs
1 Effects of US influence on commitments of IMF resources
7 G5 influence over conditionality UN voting
3 Frequency of waivers
Other editions - View all
agreement alliance portfolios Argentina bank exposure bargaining billion borrowing Brazil capital controls CFA Franc Zone Coef commitments concessions conditionality consensus cooperation costs credibility crises crisis currency debt service/exports decision deficit delegation developing countries dispute EcoFin economic effects enforcement euro euro zone European exchange rate Executive Board exercise exports fiscal foreign aid formal rules formal voting France Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung French Fund’s G-5 countries GATT Germany IMF programs IMF staff IMF’s important increase Indonesia informal governance informal influence institutional design interactions interests international organizations issues Japan Korea leading legislative legitimacy loans major measures member countries membership Mexico monetary multilateral negotiations options override participation percent political preferences procedures program suspensions proposal reform role Russia shareholders shift short-term debt significant standard deviation structural power substantial tion Trade/GDP United UNSC variables vote shares vulnerability waivers weak