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Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Many Players Differential Games: Course Held ...
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a e RN absolutely continuous admissible strategy N-tuple associated optimal control Blaquiere C1 function candidates for Pareto-optimality class C1 Collective Bargaining component conditions of Theorem continuous function continuously differentiable Control N-tuple Control Space Properties Controls and Strategies convex Cooperative Games corresponding solution decision couple decision N-tuple defined Definition 4.5 denote denumerable decomposition diCDi domain Dynamical Systems equation Finite decomposition game surface given grad g hence integral cost Isovalue Surfaces Leitmann Let functions g Maximum Principle moods of play necessary conditions Non-Cooperative Games Nonzero-Sum Note offer and demand optimal control problem Pareto performance index playable player desires player game players utilize Proof Properties of Cooperative References for Chapter Regular Optimal Trajectories saddle-point STANFORD strike subset Sufficiency for Pareto-optimality sufficiency theorems sufficient conditions target set terminal cost terminating plays terminating solution Theorem 4.2 Theory Appl trajectory in Rn transversality condition two-person zero-sum games vector x°eX