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A SEMITECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Subset solution concepts
NON TRANSFERABLE UTILITY NTUGAMES
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ACA method allocate costs allocation method applications assumed Aumann axiomatic axioms bargaining set called CGT model CGT solution concepts characteristic function coalition structure coalitional rationality concepts of CGT Cooperative Game Theory cost allocation cost function cost games cost-sharing game counter-objection defined Definition denote dummy player efficient payoff environmental and water equity example expressed as follows feasible set Formally Game Theory CGT Game Theory hereafter grand coalition important aspect associated individual rationality joining a coalition Kalai Kalai-Smorodinski Kernel Least Core lexicographic order literature marginal contribution monotonic Nash equilibrium Nash solution non-cooperative Game nonempty Core November 2006 November Nucleolus Pareto optimality payoff vector permutation positive affine transformation propensity to disrupt real numbers represents Research Working Paper satisfying Separable Cost set of players set of projects Shapley value subadditive Subset solution concepts superadditivity Theorem threat point transferable utility TU-game two-person bargaining problem veG(N water resources World Bank