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COOPERATIVE SOLUTION FOR THE RESOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
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acid rain agents involved allowed analyze approach Arcto-Norwegian cod stock assumed assumption authors bargaining power bargaining solution behavior binding agreements biomass bionomic equilibrium bluefin tuna catchability coefficient Chander and Tulkens characteristic function coastal considered cooperative game theory cooperative solution core cost allocation cost function Costa Duarte countries involved denotes depositions discount factor discount rate distant water fishing DWFNs dynamic economic entrant exploitation externalities Fish Stocks fishing effort full cooperative grand coalition guarantee harvest share important individual rationality introduce issue Kaitala and Lindroos Kaitala and Munro less efficient Nash bargaining Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium non-cooperative November 2006 November nucleolus optimal optimum outcome paper parameters Pareto-efficient payoff players Pohjola possible present value proposed resource revenues RFMO Shapley value sharing rule side-payments situation solution concepts straddling stock strategies surplus taking into account threat point transboundary transfer payments trigger strategies vector water fishing nations