Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control
Why do corporations obey the law? When companies violate the law, what kinds of interventions are most apt to correct their behavior and return them to compliant status? In this book Sally Simpson examines whether the shift towards the use of criminal law, with its emphasis on punishment and stigmatization, is an effective strategy for controlling illegal corporate behavior. She concludes that strict criminalization models will not yield sufficiently high levels of compliance. Empirical data suggest that in most cases cooperative models work best with most corporate offenders. Because some corporate managers, however, respond primarily to instrumental concerns, Simpson argues that compliance should also be buttressed by punitive strategies. Her review and application of the relevant empirical literature on corporate crime and compliance combined with her judicious examination of theory and approaches, make a valuable new contribution to the literature on white-collar crime and deterrence and criminal behavior more generally.
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CHAPTER ONE Criminalizing the Corporate Control Process
CHAPTER TWO Deterrence in Review
CHAPTER THREE Assessing the Failure of Corporate Deterrence and Criminal Justice
CHAPTER FOUR Corporate Deterrence and Civil Justice
CHAPTER FIVE Corporate Deterrence and Regulatory Justice
Alternatives to Criminalization
An Empirical Test
CHAPTER EIGHT Shaping the Contours of Control
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antitrust assess behavior benefits Braithwaite certainty and severity civil law Clinard committed compliance programs cooperative corporate crime control corporate deterrence corporate offenders costs crime inhibition crime type criminal law criminal prosecution criminal sanctions criminaljustice Criminology deterrence model Deterrence theory deterrent effects Diane Vaughan dimensions economic empirical employee Enforced Self-Regulation Environmental ethical Federal firm Fisse Ford Pinto formal legal sanctions formal sanction threats fraud Ian Ayres Ibid illegal act individual industry instance interventions John Braithwaite Justice Koper Law and Society levels likelihood managerial managers misconduct moral Nagin offending decisions offending intentions organizational penalties perceived percent perceptual deterrence persons price-fixing problem punishment punitive civil sanctions Random-Effects Models Rational Choice Raymond Paternoster regulation rence respondents safety sanction certainty scenarios shame significant Simpson social control Society Review Steelcorp strategies suggest survey target tion tort U.S. Sentencing Commission University Press variables vignette violations White-Collar Crime