Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity
Joseph McCahery, Piet Moerland, Luc Renneboog, Theo Raaijmakers
Oxford University Press, 2002 - Business & Economics - 696 pages
Corporate Governance Regimes addresses corporate law's leading question: whether one or another corporate law regime possesses relative competitive advantage. To this end, the editors have brought together an international team of scholars in economics and law to critically assess the newtheories of ownership and control which seek to explain the important efficiency advantages of dispersed ownership and the inevitable limitations of control-oriented systems of governance.Contributors describe and analyse the relative strength of the forces that shape the evolution of corporate law rules and practice. They also raise the issue of whether nations undertaking reforms should develop corporate governance policies that borrow from other systems' best practices, or pursuea course of internally designed corporate governance reforms. And, building on new theories of law and finance, they examine the incentives for introducing meaningful corporate governance reforms that disrupt or destabilize Europe's blockholding regimes.The collection is divided into seven parts. Part One provides not only a means for assessing the key features of market- and control-based systems of governance but a standpoint for determining whether national governance systems are likely to converge on a single, optimal system of governance. PartTwo introduces the reader to the building blocks of European corporate governance and the securities law harmonization program. Part Three examines the complex ownership and control structures that are found in Western Europe, investigating the consequences of large shareholdings for minorityinvestors. Part Four offers law and finance analyses of the relationship between legal and financial systems and corporate performance. Part Five looks at the economic perspective on the operation of the market for corporate control and the key legal rules and institutions of the bankruptcy andinsolvency regimes in the USA and Britain. Part Six is devoted to exploring the economic effect of institutional shareholder participation in corporate governance in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The final section, Part Seven, evaluates empirically the executive compensation arrangementsin the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The contributions supply a pool of current research on the motivational effect of performance-related remuneration and the substantial increase in top executive remuneration in the USA.
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Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes
Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?
What are the Preconditions
Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Control
The Emergence of
Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe
Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency On the Role
Effects on Firm Performance
The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm
Managerial Disciplining and the Market for Partial
A Comparison of English and American Bankruptcy Procedures
Reorganization Law and Dilution Threats in Different Financial Systems
Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy
The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance
Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance
Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe
Who Controls German Corporations?
Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder
How do Financial Systems Affect Economic Performance?
A Simple Model
13th Directive abnormal returns accounting activism assets average bankruptcy banks Black–Scholes blockholders CalPERS cent chapter compensation competition convergence corporate control corporate governance corporate law countries creditors debt disclosure employees equity market European example executive executive compensation Financial Economics firm's firms fund managers German growth holders holdings hostile takeovers incentives increase industry institutional investors interest investment IPOs Journal of Financial large shareholders liquidity listed companies managerial market value monitoring non-executive directors OECD owner ownership and control ownership concentration ownership structure pension funds percent poison pills political positive premium private benefits profits proxy proxy fights reform regime regulation remuneration reorganization role rules sample Section securities markets share price shareholder proposals significant social democracy stakeholders stock market stock options stock price stock-based studies target tender offer trading turnover variable voting blocks voting rights
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